An attack on online password conifer occurs when a smart card is lost or stolen and the opponent tries to guess the password to sign up for the system. Suppose an opponent receives information inside the smart card using channel attacks and successfully obtains “Ai, Bi, Di,h (.), PF (.), bih (Ai‖X) ⊕h (IDi‖RPWi), Dih (Ai ‖ RPWi ‖ IDi) and RPWi-h (PWi ‖ To guess the password above the setting stored in the smart card, the opponent must reverse the value of Bi or Di. However, the reversal of the values of Bi or Di is not mathematically feasible due to the characteristics of the towing process. Or IDi. or PWi will never be directly discovered or suspended and an opponent will certainly not be able to guess or change the password. Therefore, the proposed scheme resists an attack on the knowledge of offline identifiers. First sentence Suppose it is the anonymous authentication and key exchange protocol for WSN described in the previous section, and it is an opponent of the TPP against EFT security, which is run on time and sends to different instances for most of the registration oracle queries. If the signature scheme used in our protocol is existentially undistorted against attacks from adaptive selected messages, the hash functions are all modeled as random oracles. in the case of the coH, the adversary`s advantage in the event of a breach of the efT security of the protocol is at most that a malicious legal participant tries to obtain a common secret key belonging to another legal participant. In the proposed regulations, there are three secret keys with common data that are XBS-GWNj, RIj and h (Ai‖X). All are generated by the BS base station and contain the secret key to BS X.
Since the secret BS key is known only by BS and is never disclosed to others and the common key between participants is never disclosed to other irrelevant participants, the proposed scheme is immune from a common secret key loss. This is why the proposed system is resistant to insider attacks. To initiate the organization, the SA system administrator selects a different identity IDSNj for the MNj sensor node, with 1≤j≤m and for each GWNj gateway node selecting a different IDGWNj of different identity. SA calculates the shared key RJ-h (IDSNj‖X) for SNj, X being the secret key to the BS base station and calculates the h key (XBS GWNj) for GWNj. Finally, SA “RIj, IDSNj” stores in SNj`s memory and stores the memory of “SNj” (XBS-GWNj), IDGWNj, in THE memory of GWNj. Subsequently, SA makes each SNj and GWNj sensor node available in a target area. Here, SA acts as a BS representative to initiate identity and common key with SNj and GWNj. In this subsection, we show: that our scheme is very effective because of the higher performance: low computing cost (0.14 ms for the user, 0.12 ms for the sensor node and 0.22 ms for the GWN, low energy consumption (18.2 J for the authentication and key agreement phase) and low cost of communication (4 messages transmitted for the authentication phase and the key phase).
, 0 messages sent for the password change phase). Although this study discusses the weaknesses of The Scheme of Ali et al., this study also recognizes the importance and benefits of its scheme, particularly because of the novelty of its study. This study also followed its architecture for monitoring agriculture with the WSNs, also using dynamic pseudonym identity and three-factor security, which are similar to Ali et al. Schema. This section consists of three subsections that discuss the meaning and benefit of the Ali et al. system and the weaknesses of the Ali et al. system and the weaknesses of the Ali et al. system.